Holly Wood
Global Sociology
Dr. Jean-Jacque Sene
07/20/03
Democracy in Iraq
Throughout the centuries, the Middle East has been a hotbed of political as well as societal unrest. The Bush administration believes that democracy offers the elusive panacea to this perennial malcontent and by molding Iraq into an ideal government; it can somehow resolve the irresolvable. But the verdict is still out as to whether democracy is a sustainable form of government in the Arabic world. Iraqi society lacks the three fundamental tenants of modern democracy being the belief in intrinsic political authority, the concept of majority rule, and egalitarianism.
It is important to note that it is difficult to separate the Islamic civilization from its deeply embedded roots in authoritarian principles. Before Middle Eastern modernization, the governance of Iraq was divided into tribal units. Leadership of these tribes was distributed mainly by heredity and concentrated amongst the dominant males. In return for sworn allegiance, the tribal leader would discuss and resolve pertinent issues through consensus-building and this methodology manifested itself into the authoritarian regimes of modern Middle Eastern governance (Garfinkle). The Koran's concept of sovereignty "is universal, transcendental, indivisible, inalienable, and truly absolute" (Smock). God is considered the ultimate sovereign lawgiver and gives the Khalifa, or God's agents of earth, the "marginal autonomy" necessary to implement his laws. The concept of giving sovereignty to an unbeliever would be considered blasphemous to a Muslim. "The Arab world is a political desert with no real political parties, no free press, and few pathways for dissent. As a result, the mosque became the sole place to discuss politics" (Zakaria 142). However, the structure of the mosque has never included a universally obeyed figurehead to distribute the religion. "Islam, whose ownership, interpretation, and use are open to all, continues to be dragged into the arena as a sharp instrument that may be used by the ruler and opposition alike, by the modernists and conservatives alike, and by groups on the left or the right of the political spectrum" (Smock). This explains why fundamentalist leaders such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have been able to rise to power. The Western concept of intrinsic right, or given authority of the people, by the people, for the people, is completely alien to traditional Iraqis and they have never recognized intrinsic authority (Garfinkle). For most Muslims today, the leader is one who vocalizes and propagates God's law and therefore they cannot recognize the authority of one who does not share these beliefs. The Iraqi people are accustomed to a patriarchal, omnipotent leader and the transition to a democratically elected leader may abrade the traditionalism that characterizes the nation.
"Islam is a radically monadic religion of divine revolution, and Islamic political culture has developed over more than 1,300 years wholly true to that principle. Since divine, extrinsic authority cannot be disputed there is no logic to political pluralism as a permanent or ideal condition. Tolerance for any other set of social and political principles amounts to heresy." (Garfinkle)
This is particularly recognizable in the segregation of the Sunnis and the Shiites within Iraq and the social unrest their religious difference engender.
"Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy" (Zakaria). It is interesting to note that 66% of the 192 countries in the world are electoral democracies but only 25% of the 47 Muslim majority nations can claim the same (Inglehart). In many regions of the world, democratic elections could produce a more illiberal government than the status quo. As James Madison explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in a democracy comes from "the majority of the community." The values of the Iraqi majority, the Shiites, do not, by any means, parallel those of Americans. As Shiite fundamentalist Abdule Karim al-Enzi explains, "Democracy means choosing what people want, not what the West wants" (Zakaria). The paramount fear today for much of Iraq, particularly for the Sunnis in the center and the Kurds in the north, would be the implantation of democracy, solely because of the threatening rule of the Shiite majority, who comprise 62% of the nation (Florio). The Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam differ in their interpretations of Islam. While both follow Mohammed's teachings as written in the Holy Koran, Shiites follow the teachings of "imams" who they believe to have descended directly from Mohammed's son-in-law. The conflict between these two ethnic groups has historically disrupted the peace in the Middle East. In Pakistan, where 20% of the Muslim population is Shiite, ethnic clashes have resulted in over 600 deaths in the Punjab province alone (Florio). In 1980, the Iran-Iraq War began as the Sunni dominated Iraq feared the newly formed Shiite dominated government ruled by revolutionist, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The war lasted over eight years and resulted in over a million deaths and increased tensions throughout the region for decades after. Under the Sunni Muslim dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the Shiite majority held no power in Iraq. Under Democracy, the Shiites might use free elections to gain total dominance as the majority gains absolute sovereignty. The United States cannot hastily press countries into elections. As we have seen in the Bosnian elections, one year after the Dayton Peace Accords, the people elected into power the same "ugly ethnic forces" that have made it nearly impossible to build a liberal democracy there (Zakaria 155). As Zakaria warns: elections can be disastrous; "Unless majority rule is accompanied by legal protections, tolerance and respect for minorities, the result can be populist repression" (Kristof). Today, it is absurd to an Iraqi that a candidate who receives 57% of the popular vote be given 100% of the power, whereas the minority candidate who receives 43% gets none because the tradition of the authoritarian was to build a consensus of his populous through mediation and not leave a minority excluded (Garfinkle). Once an ethnic group achieves power, it will be easier to exclude other ethnic groups from gaining it. Thus, Iraq will transform from a tyrannical dictatorship to an oppressive, Shiite led democracy that ignores the rights of almost half its citizens.
The progress of a democratic society can best be evaluated by its commitment to egalitarianism. As America gave a greater percentage of its citizen's suffrage, it became obvious that the nation experienced greater democracy. However, "the real fault line between the West and Islam concerns gender equality and sexual liberalization," or eros rather than demos (Inglehart). According to the CIA World Factbook, women are a minority in Iraq and less than a fourth of them are deemed literate. But the motivation for change in cultural attitudes seems to lay more in modernization than it does in the Muslim religion itself. Indonesia, the most Muslim nation in the world, has maintained a secular government since 1949 and has recently elected a female president. The real problem lay not in the Muslim religion, but in the Middle East. In America, women did not achieve suffrage until 1920, or just after the industrial revolution. In Iraq, where the oil industry comprises of 95% of the foreign exchange, there has been no need to industrialize. This unique situation, unlike that of the United States or the majority of Western nations, may be the underlying problem in Iraq's gender inequalities. Industrialization typically pushes women into the work force, where they learn new skills and thus literacy rates increase. Once this industrialization phase has been implemented, women move into higher-status economic roles in management and gain political influence. Turkey, both an industrialized and predominantly Muslim nation, reflects this trend as it is considered the most gender-tolerant Muslim nation in the world (Inglehart).
<…I deleted the conclusion because this was written in July and it pertained to situations that were addressed by the US government in November. However, I feel the paper itself is still relevant>
© Copyright July 20th, 2003 Holly Wood. All rights reserved. Holly has granted Stupid-boy.Com, its affiliates and its syndicates non-exclusive rights to display this work. And there was much rejoicing.
Works Cited
Banerjee, Neela. "After the War: Urban Violence." The New York Times. 16 July 2003: A1.
Byman, Daniel L., and Pollack, Kenneth M. "Democracy in Iraq?." The Washington Quarterly. 26:3 (2003): 119.
Florio, Gwen. "Culture of Contrasts: Sunni, Shiite Muslims an Uneasy Religious Mix." The Denver Post. 12 March 2003.
Garfinkle, Adam. "Middle Eastern Democracy." Prospect. 20 March 2003.
Gelfond, Lauren. "Democracy Drowning." The Jerusalem Post. 23 May 2003.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Norris, Pippa. "The True Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Policy. March/April 2003:62.
"Iraq." CIA World Factbook 2002. CIA. 20 July 2003. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>.
Kristof, Nicholas D. "Cover Your Hair." The New York Times. 26 June 2003.
Smock, David. "Islam and Democracy" The United States Institute of Peace. 21 Jul. 2003 <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr93.html>
Susman, Tina. "Women of Iraq Fear the Future." Newsday. 16 July 2003.
"The Twin Challenges of Democracy and Education." Mideast Mirror. 16 June 2003.
Plotz, David. "Democracy—Faster, Better, Smarter." The Slate. 25 April 2003. <http://slate.msn.com/id/2081984/>. 8 July 2003.
VanDoodewaard, William. Islam United? A Comparison of Shi'ite and Sunni Belief and Practice. <http://www.rim.org/muslim/shiite.htm>. 25 July 2003.
Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.
Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs. Nov/Dec 1997.



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